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for war was won and maintained”, “how ex-
treme and escalating violence … radicalized 
German and Austro-Hungarian war aims 
and actions, and … the consequences of this 
radicalization” and “the tragic societal frag-
mentation caused by the First World War”, 
which carried on in interwar central Europe 
(pp. 4-5). And indeed, he delivers the goods. 
Watson’s thorough and thought-provoking 
analysis is supported by impressive array of 
the ever growing literature and, especially 
relevant to his approach, archival research 
conducted in five countries in which indi-
vidual stories and local experiences feature 
prominently in diaries and letters. 
In discussing the war’s origins, Wat-
son comes down on the side of those who 
dismiss Frantz Fischer’s thesis of the main 
German culpability. He recognizes that it 
was the leadership of Austria-Hungary that 
single-mindedly wanted and planned for 
a war, albeit a local one with Serbia rather 
than a general European conflagration, but 
fully aware that the latter might easily spark 
from aggression against Serbia. He un-
derscores, however, that it was fear for the 
survival of the Dual Monarchy rather than 
aggressive designs that prompted its leaders 
to embark on a war. This is no doubt true to 
a great extent, but the crux of the problem is 
that security concerns are often the breed-
ing ground for plans of preventive wars and 
Serbia was too small a country to justify the 
excessive Austro-Hungarian dread of South 
Slav (Yugoslav) irredentism. Coupled with 
the conspicuous lack of understanding for 
the position of Imperial Russia, the author 
seems to be too much lenient to the role 
played by Central Powers in the run-up to 
the war. It is revealing in this respect that he 
Alexander Watson (Goldsmith, Univer-
sity of London) has produced a lengthy and 
wide-ranging book on the Great War that 
received much acclaim as evidenced by a 
number of awards ‒ the Wolfson History 
Prize and Guggenheim-Lehrman Prize in 
Military History in 2014 and the Distin-
guished Book Award from the Society for 
Military History in 2015. It thus secured a 
prominent place amongst a deluge of works 
that emerged on the centenary of the out-
break of the war and not without good rea-
son. The author had already explored the 
topic of the 1914-1918 ordeal in his previ-
ous monograph.1 Watson has described this 
book himself as “the first modern history to 
narrate the Great War from the perspective 
of the two major Central Powers, Germany 
and Austria-Hungary” (p. 1). This is an ex-
aggeration as Holger Herwig wrote such a 
study nearly two decades earlier.2 But the 
two books are different in their approach: 
while Herwig explored traditional diplo-
matic and military history, Watson’s work, 
although by no means neglecting high poli-
tics, international relations and military 
campaigns, pays close attention to what the 
experience of war meant for the populations 
of the two Central Powers, reflecting a more 
recent innovative turn in historiography. 
His analysis thus belongs to the thriving 
genre of a “history from below” and herein 
lies its strength. More specifically, the author 
addresses three main themes: “how consent 
1 Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: 
Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German 
and British Armies, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
2 Holger Herwig, The First World War: Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918 (Lon-
don: Edward Arnold, 1997).  * Institute for Balkan Studies SASA
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errs in claiming that Germany and Austria-
Hungary sacrificed more than other bellig-
erents, including Serbia which lost a quarter 
of her population. 
But the central argument of the book is 
that popular consent was rallied solidly be-
hind the Hohenzollern and Habsburg war 
efforts and made them possible. This was 
manifest in the smooth mobilization of their 
armies in the summer of 1914. For Germany, 
it was necessary to attain national consensus 
across the political spectrum, namely to en-
sure the consent of Social Democrats, and 
that was done in large measure due to skilful 
politics of the Kaiser and German govern-
ment. In a multiethnic society such was the 
Habsburg Empire, in which the Slav part 
of population was politically subdued and 
discriminated in the south of the country, 
it appeared doubtful that national solidarity 
could be expected. But, contrary to expec-
tations, both reservists and civil society at 
large readily responded to the call to arms. 
Watson explains this success as stemming 
from what he calls “double mobilization”, a 
congruity between loyalty to the Habsburg 
state idea, and especially to the venerable 
Franz Joseph, and national aspirations of 
different ethnic communities, which until 
the late stage in the war were content to re-
alize their ambitions within the Habsburg 
framework. In this strain, Watson believes 
that the Austro-Hungarian authorities fell 
victim to “the illusory nature of the govern-
ment’s fears that the South Slav lands were 
seriously tempted by a greater Serbia” (p. 
60). If the suspicions of South Slavs’ fidelity 
were unfounded, as it has been claimed, then 
the suspicions of Czechs, for example, must 
have been paranoid. The author reinforces 
his argument by stressing that the extraor-
dinary feature of the war was the enduring 
support of Habsburg nationalities, despite 
the horrendous casualties at battlefields 
and hardships at the home front. Although 
there is much to be said for this contention, 
its validity ultimately hinges on how we de-
fine “popular consent”, because that could 
be interpreted in a way that encompasses a 
range of popular attitudes, from enthusiasm 
to listless compliance and obedience. And 
of course, popular attitudes in the Habs-
burg Monarchy varied from one national-
ity to the other. Contrary to the author, the 
present reviewer doubts that a propaganda 
campaign would have raised the morale of 
Czech troops leaving for the front (p. 251), 
who had good reasons to feel alienated from 
the Habsburg war effort.
The real gems of this book, however, 
relate to the experiences of ordinary Ger-
man and Austro-Hungarian soldiers, their 
conduct on the front and especially towards 
populace in the enemy territory, and civil-
ians who did their best to cope with noto-
rious food shortages caused by the British 
naval blockade and support their loved ones 
in the army. Especially engaging is Watson’s 
discussion of the war crimes committed 
against civilians in Belgium, East Prus-
sia, Austrian Galicia and Serbia. He shows 
that much of atrocities did not result from 
any premeditated action, but rather sprung 
from the affects that a new combat situation 
had on the still untried soldiers. For exam-
ple, grossly exaggerated fears of spying and 
civilian irregulars prompted the occupying 
forces to resort to summary and brutal re-
prisals in breach of international law. This 
is in line with Gumz’s account of the Hab-
sburg troops’ massacres of Serbian civilians 
in 1914 on which Watson heavily relies.3 The 
similarities of such atrocities on both sides of 
the front and in different regions populated 
by different peoples are striking and offer 
considerable evidence for the author’s con-
tention. Much more controversial is Wat-
son’s interpretation of the atrocities against 
civilians in the eastern “bloodlands”4 of the 
3 Jonathan Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse 
of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
4 A reference to Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: 
Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: 
Basic Books, 2010). 
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continent in 1914-1918 as antecedents of 
the Nazi campaigns of extermination in the 
Second World War. He singles out Russian 
atrocities from the opening phase of the war 
in East Prussia and Galicia as “the closest 
link between the campaigns of 1914 and the 
genocidal horrors of the mid-twentieth cen-
tury” (p. 205). Apart from geography, it re-
mains unclear why that would be a case given 
that the author concedes that the scale of 
violence committed by “Tsarist troops” was 
“no different than that of the more famous 
contemporaneous German atrocities in Bel-
gium and France” (p. 171). In terms of their 
scale and savagery proportionately to the 
size of and the number of population in the 
invaded territory, Austro-Hungarian crimes 
in the north-west of Serbia were probably 
the worst of all during the Great War. Those 
also owed much to the vicious pre-war 
propaganda which dehumanized the “cultur-
ally inferior” Serbs, as another recent study 
shows and, incidentally, refutes Gumz’s and 
Watson’s insistence on the purely reactive 
nature of war crimes generated by fear of 
comitadji irregulars.5 Watson seems to waver 
himself in his appreciation of Nazi anteced-
ents, especially when he assesses the German 
occupation regime in the Baltic (Ober Ost) 
and the part of Polish land designated for 
annexation to the Reich; he finds that Ger-
man plans for colonization “appear to point 
towards the larger, genocidal racial organiza-
tion of the east desired a quarter of a century 
later by the Nazis” (p. 398). Further research 
might test the argument that the impetus 
for German war plans, which increasingly 
included radical schemes for annexation and 
settlement, based on racial precepts can be 
reduced to the trauma of experiencing Rus-
sian invasion in 1914 (p. 266).  
5 See Hannes Leidinger’s chapter on the esca-
lation of violence in Hannes Leidinger et al., 
eds., Habsburgs schmutziger Krieg (Vienna: 
Residenz Verlag, 2014); this edited volume is 
published in Serbian: Prljavi rat Habzburga 
(Novi Sad: Prometej, 2016). 
In the way of an epilogue, Watson dis-
cusses the woeful legacy of the ordeal that 
more than four years of bitter fighting left to 
Europe, rearranged at the end of the conflict 
and at the Versailles peace conference. His 
remark that “the old continent of empires 
was giving way to one of imperfect nation 
states” (p. 535) is instructive of his lack of 
sympathy for the new international order. 
He shares this view with Margaret Mac-
Millan, whose work he deems engaging,6 
and some other historians, but many would 
strongly disagree. Still, returning to his 
theme of social fragmentation, Watson is 
right in pointing out that class and racial 
differences, so dramatically inflamed during 
the war, remained to plague most societies 
after 1918, both in the old and successor 
states. It is important to remember that the 
existential threats of war, including hunger, 
crushed inter-ethnic and inter-religious tol-
erance within communities, such as that of 
Cracow for instance, with Jews being par-
ticularly exposed to violence. 
Overall, Watson’s painstakingly re-
searched and highly readable book contrib-
utes most to our understanding of human 
suffering and day-to-day experience of the 
Great War with its richness in detail to 
which the constraints of a space in a review 
do little justice. A Balkan specialist should 
bear in mind that the discussion of Balkan 
and South Slav matters does not match the 
detailed treatment of Galicia, which is, to 
a great extent, conditioned by the author’s 
research in Polish archives. With its many 
admirable qualities, this study is certain to 
generate much interest both among scholars 
and general readership.  
6 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: Six 
Months that Changed the World (London: John 
Murray, 2009).
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